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I. Introduction
Since 1952, Cornell University Prof . Emeritus John W . Reps 
has taught, studied, and written about the planning of cities, 
suburbs, and farms .1 The American Planning Association 
has recognized him as a planning pioneer .2 He is perhaps 
the first scholar to recognize that the best way to understand 
planning’s future is to study planning’s past .3 In 1964, Pro-
fessor Reps delivered the Pomeroy Memorial Lecture at the 
American Society of Planning Officials’ annual conference .4
In a talk titled Requiem for Zoning,5 he made three 
salient points . First, he rejected the assumption that com-
prehensive zoning ordinances could provide maps that 
would draw bright lines putting everything, once and for 
all, in the proper place .6 Second, he urged that planners be 
legislatively vested with broad and flexible regulatory pow-
ers so as to permit them to guide the community toward 
shared social, economic, and environmental goals .7 Third, 
his faith in “judicial liberalism” left him assured that the 
U .S . Supreme Court would not stand in the way of discre-
tionary and flexible land use planning .8
With the benefit of 50 years’ hindsight, this Comment 
considers the prescience of Professor Reps’ observations 
and predictions .
II. Analysis of the Changing Landscape
A. The Quiet Revolution in Land Planning
By the 1970s, most students of government had come to 
agree with Professor Reps that American society needed 
1 . John W . Reps, John W. Reps Biographical Note, http://urbanplanning .library .
cornell .edu/DOCS/jwrvita .htm (last visited May 28, 2014) .
2 . Id.
3 . Id.
4 . John W . Reps, Pomeroy Memorial Lecture: Requiem for Zoning, in Plan-
ning 1964: Selected Papers From the ASPO Planning Conference 
56 (1964) .
5 . Id.
6 . Id.; see also Constance Perin, Everything in Its Place: Social Order 
and Land Use in America (1979) .
7 . Reps, supra note 4, at 64 .
8 . Id. at 66 .
more and better planning .9 According to the consensus 
viewpoint, free markets no longer had the answers for the 
overcrowded cities, stressed natural environments, and 
acute social problems . The national government needed to 
take command over water and air quality, and state and 
local governments needed top-down federal aid .10 All three 
levels of government must follow the example set by the 
social democracies of Western Europe and put in place 
regulations that would plan for a better society .11
American governments had the constitutionally req-
uisite powers . State and local governments were vested 
with a “police power” to promote “public health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare .”12 The federal government 
was vested with a more specific power to “regulate Com-
merce  .   .   . among the several States .”13 Any new regula-
tions however, might deprive some private owners of their 
property rights and might deprive some capitalists of their 
“investment-backed expectations .”14 And the U .S . Consti-
tution prohibited all governments from “taking” private 
property15 or “impairing” contract rights .16 The Constitu-
tion even more sharply curtailed the regulatory power of 
the national government to matters of interstate trade .17 
When would bold new plans for a Great Society not run 
afoul of the Constitution?
Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr . had 
answered that question in the landmark 1922 case of Penn-
sylvania Coal v. Mahon .18 Therein he opined that when “the 
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking .”19 
His statement, of course, begged the constitutional ques-
tion: How far is too far?
9 . See Fred Bosselman & David Callies, Council on Envtl . Quality, The 
Quiet Revolution in Land Use Control (1971); Otis L . Graham, To-
wards a Planned Society (1976); Charles Reich, The Law of the Planned 
Society, 75 Yale L .J . 1227 (1966) .
10 . Id.
11 . Id.
12 . Village of Euclid v . Ambler Realty Co ., 272 U .S . 365, 395 (1926) .
13 . U .S . Const . art . I, §8 .
14 . Penn Cent . Transp . Co . v . New York City, 438 U .S . 104, 124, 8 ELR 20528 
(1978) .
15 . U .S . Const . amend . V .
16 . U .S . Const . art . I, §10 .
17 . U .S . Const . art . I, §8 .
18 . Pennsylvania Coal v . Mahon, 260 U .S . 393 (1922) .
19 . Id. at 415 (emphasis added) .
Author’s Note: I thank Casandra Mejias, a research fellow in the 
Thurgood Marshall Law Library, for outstanding editorial assistance.
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B. Constitutional Limitations on Regulations
By the three-quarter mark of the 20th century, a remark-
able set of Supreme Court precedents had swollen the 
regulatory powers of governments while shrinking private 
rights to property and contract . The Court had given the 
regulators wide discretion . Consider the following:
In Lewis v. Blue Point Oysters Cultivation Co., the U .S . 
Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) dredged a shipping 
channel that destroyed a company’s privately owned oyster 
grounds on the bed of Long Island Sound .20 The Supreme 
Court’s 1913 decision held that the U .S . Congress’ domi-
nant power over the nation’s navigable waterways trumped 
private property rights .21
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., an Ohio town 
enacted a building zone law that prohibited a landowner 
from making commercial business use of its main street 
property,22 which devalued the lot by two-thirds .23 Ruling 
in 1926, the Court upheld the village’s decision to create 
exclusively residential districts .24 It concluded that “the 
validity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes 
[being] fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be 
allowed to control .”25 Regulations are presumed to bear 
a “rational relation[ship] to the health and safety of the 
community”26; the burden of proof is on the challenger to 
show that the regulations “go too far .”27
In the 1928 case Miller v. Schoene, the state of Virginia 
destroyed a landowner’s ornamental cedar trees that har-
bored a plant disease and were infecting apple orchards in 
the vicinity .28 The Court condoned the practice: “When 
forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its constitu-
tional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class 
of property in order to save another which, in the judgment 
of the legislature, is of greater value to the public .”29 When 
the public benefit from regulations exceeds the private loss, 
the Constitution guarantees no compensation .30
In 1940, in United States v. Appalachian Electric Power 
Co., the Court considered whether a federal agency had 
licensing authority over the location of a hydroelectric 
facility on a river running between two states .31 The first 
exercises of the Commerce Power had been designed to 
promote waterborne transport of goods .32 But by the 20th 
century, the Court recognized that the federal government 
was also empowered to regulate broader aspects of the 
nation’s economy .
20 . Lewis v . Blue Point Oysters Cultivation Co ., 229 U .S . 82, 85 (1913) .
21 . Id. at 89 .
22 . Village of Euclid v . Ambler Realty Co ., 272 U .S . 365, 383-84 (1926) .
23 . Id. at 384 .
24 . Id. at 392 .
25 . Id. at 389 .
26 . Id. at 391 .
27 . Id. at 389 (implying that a regulation would have to be arbitrary and be-
yond the bounds of reason to overcome presumption of validity) .
28 . Miller v . Schoene, 276 U .S . 272, 277 (1928) .
29 . Id. at 279 .
30 . Id. at 280 .
31 . United States v . Appalachian Elec . Power Co ., 311 U .S . 377 (1940) .
32 . See, e.g., Gibbons v . Ogden, 22 U .S . 1 (1824); Gilman v . City of Philadel-
phia, 70 U .S . 713 (1865) .
In Berman v. Parker, a District of Columbia urban 
renewal agency used its power of eminent domain to take 
the landowner’s building as part of a slum clearance proj-
ect .33 The landowner objected that his building was not a 
slum,34 and that it was to be retransferred after the clear-
ance to the private ownership of another .35 In 1954, the 
Court ruled for the government .36 If just compensation is 
paid, then the government may take private property for 
any purpose it considers a public purpose .37
These precedents set the stage for the 1978 landmark 
case of Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City .38 
The New York City Landmark Preservation Board had 
denied permission for Penn Central Railroad to build a 
skyscraper atop its historic Grand Central Station .39 The 
loss to the railroad was approximately $50 million .40 The 
Court’s opinion demonstrated the analysis to be employed 
when determining whether regulations go “too far .”41 It 
engaged in “an essentially ad hoc factual inquiry” without 
any “set formula” and created a multifactor balancing test 
that considered the magnitude of the loss, the interference 
with investment-backed expectation, and the character of 
the government action .42 In the balance, the Court’s major-
ity determined that no unconstitutional taking of private 
property had occurred .43
Associate Justice William Rehnquist dissented .44 He 
simply observed that under the real property law of New 
York, air rights were a separable property interest, which 
the Board’s ruling denied the railroad’s right to sell .45 
From Justice Rehnquist’s point of view, no amount of “ad 
hoc balancing” could rationalize away the taking of the 
air rights .46
Post-Penn Central, there appeared to be no real obsta-
cles—political or constitutional—to the creation of a 
well-planned, pollution-free society . Congress established 
national standards for “clean air”47 and “clean water .”48 
When the Nixon Administration’s federal land use initia-
tive49 was left in the lurch by President Richard Nixon’s 
resignation as he faced impeachment, state governments 
33 . Berman v . Parker, 348 U .S . 26, 31 (1954) .
34 . Id. at 31 .
35 . Id. at 33 .
36 . Id. at 36 .
37 . Id.
38 . 438 U .S . 104, 8 ELR 20528 (1978) .
39 . Id. at 117 .
40 . Id. at 118 .
41 . Id. at 124 .
42 . Id.
43 . Id. at 137 .
44 . Justice Rehnquist’s dissent was joined by Chief Justice Warren Burger and 
Associate Justice John Paul Stevens . Penn Cent . Transp . Co . v . New York 
City, 438 U .S . 104, 138, 8 ELR 20528 (1978) (Rehnquist, J ., dissenting) .
45 . Id. at 142 .
46 . Id. at 148-49 .
47 . Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act) Amendments of 
1972, Pub . L . No . 92-500, 86 Stat . 816 . The Clean Water Act (CWA) 
is codified as amended at 33 U .S .C . §§1251-1387, ELR Stat . FWPCA 
§§101-607 .
48 . Clean Air Act (CAA), Pub . L . No . 88-206, 69 Stat . 322 (codified as amend-
ed at 42 U .S .C . §§7401-7671q, ELR Stat . CAA §§101-618 .) .
49 . Land Use Policy & Planning Assistance Act, S . 268, 93rd Cong . (1973) .
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undertook their own “quiet revolution in land use control .”50 
State laws addressed the complex problems of reallocating 
responsibilities between state and local governments .51 At 
the local level, detailed zoning maps had been supplanted 
by development agreements .52 Negotiations between the 
local jurisdiction and the landowner contractually fixed 
the terms and conditions upon which projects may go for-
ward .53 The developer was contractually guaranteed proj-
ect approval, while the locality benefitted from customized 
performance standards and assurances that infrastructure 
demands would be meet .54
C. The Planned Society Reconsidered
Ronald Reagan was elected president in 1980, taking 
office in 1981 . In his Inaugural Address, President Rea-
gan proclaimed that “government is not the solution to our 
problem, government is the problem .”55 He blamed gov-
ernment regulations for the nation’s shortcomings .56 Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the Court’s leading property rights activist, 
now found himself with an ally in the White House .57 For 
the next 17 years, Justice Rehnquist would endeavor to 
muster a majority of Justices willing to reverse or ignore 
the pro-planning precedents .58 He set out to curtail the 
federal Commerce Power and to require compensation to 
all property holders for all “regulatory takings” by all levels 
of government .59
Justice Rehnquist had already had his first success in 
Kaiser Aetna v. United States in 1979 .60 In that case, the 
Corps’ effort to turn a privately owned tidal pond into a 
public aquatic park was declared unconstitutional .61 Pri-
vate parties could once again assert property rights in 
the nation’s waterways . Lewis was not overruled, but it 
was forgotten .62
In 1982, Justice Rehnquist forged a surprising collab-
oration when he joined a majority opinion authored by 
the liberal Justice Thurgood Marshall in Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp .63 New York law autho-
rized a cable television utility to place a transformer atop 
a landowner’s building, without permission .64 Rather 
than subjectively balancing the public good against the 
50 . Bosselman & Callies, supra note 9, at 1 (1971) .
51 . Id. at 319-20 .
52 . John J. Delaney, Development Agreements Legislation: The Maryland Experi-
ence, SB06 ALI-ABA 805, 811-12 (1996) .
53 . Id. at 811 .
54 . Id. at 812 .
55 . Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan . 20, 1981), in Inaugural Ad-
dresses of the Presidents of the United States From George Wash-
ington 1789 to George Bush 1989, 331, 332 (2008) .
56 . Id.
57 . See Dawn E . Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congres-
sional Power: Presidential Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 Ind . L .J . 
363, 366-67 (2003) .
58 . See id. at 391 .
59 . See id. at 392 .
60 . Kaiser Aetna v . United States, 444 U .S . 164, 10 ELR 20042 (1979) .
61 . Id. at 181 .
62 . Lewis v . Blue Point Oysters Cultivation Co ., 229 U .S . 82 (1913) .
63 . 458 U .S . 419 (1982) .
64 . Id. at 421 .
private loss, the Court ruled (and Justice Rehnquist 
agreed) that any governmentally ordered “permanent 
physical occupation” must be categorically compensa-
ble .65 The Penn Central precedent was not overruled, but 
it was displaced by a bright-line rule of compensation in 
this situation .
In 1986, President Reagan elevated Justice Rehnquist 
to Chief Justice and appointed Justice Antonin Scalia 
as an Associate Justice .66 At their investiture, Presi-
dent Reagan charged them both to use their seats on 
the Court to downsize and disempower governments 
at all levels .67 Thereafter, Justices Scalia and Rehnquist 
worked together in an effort to convince at least three 
other Justices to join them in constitutionally curbing 
the planning powers of governments .
In 1987, in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 
a state commission had “leveraged its police power” by 
demanding the dedication of a public beachfront easement 
as the price for approval of a private landowner’s building 
permit application .68 Writing for a five-Justice majority on 
a split Court, Justice Scalia strictly scrutinized the transac-
tion and struck it down as an “out and out plan of extor-
tion” in the absence of proof by the regulator that there 
was an “essential nexus” between the burden on the public 
from the proposed construction and the “kickback” miti-
gation exacted from the applicant .69
In 1994, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, the regulator 
demanded dedication of a bicycle trail as the price of 
approval of an expansion of a hardware store .70 Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for a majority of five, conceded the 
nexus between the bike trail and increased business traffic, 
but added the requirement that the cost to the applicant be 
“roughly proportionate” to the burden that the requested 
activity would place on the public .71
In these two cases, Justices Rehnquist and Scalia had 
worked in tandem to turn the standard of constitutional 
review upside down . Under the Village of Euclid tradition, 
regulatory actions were presumed constitutional and could 
only be overturned if the challenger met the heavy bur-
den of proving that the law had “no substantial relation to 
the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare .”72 As 
reconceived by Nollan and Dolan, police power exactions 
were constitutionally invalid unless the regulator could 
meet the burden of proving them to be justified .73
The totality-of-the-circumstances test and balanc-
ing modes of analysis found in Penn Central were the 
65 . Id. at 441 .
66 . Johnsen, supra note 57, at 399 .
67 . Ronald Reagan, Former President of the United States, Speech at the Inves-
titure of Chief Justice William H . Rehnquist and Associate Justice Antonin 
Scalia at the White House (Sept . 26, 1986), in Originalism: A Quarter-
Century of Debate (Steven G . Calabresi ed ., 2007) .
68 . Nollan v . California Coastal Comm’n, 483 U .S . 825, 828, 17 ELR 20918 
(1987) .
69 . Id.
70 . Dolan v . City of Tigard, 512 U .S . 374, 380, 24 ELR 21083 (1994) .
71 . Id. at 391 .
72 . Village of Euclid v . Ambler Realty Co ., 272 U .S . 365, 395 (1926) .
73 . See Koontz v . St . Johns River Water Mgmt . Dist ., 133 S . Ct . 2586, 2591, 43 
ELR 20140 (2013) .
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bane of Justice Scalia’s jurisprudence . It was far better, 
he would say, for constitutional tests to take the form of 
clear and principled rules of decision; bright lines, and 
clear categories creating a “Rule of Law” rather than a 
rule of judges .74
An opportunity for Justice Scalia to overrule Penn Cen-
tral was presented in 1992, when certiorari was granted in 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission .75 South Caro-
lina legislation had established a new setback line that was 
necessary to “prevent serious public harm,” but which ren-
dered Lucas’ oceanfront building lots “value-less .”76 Justice 
Scalia was not successful in his effort to muster a majority 
willing to reject Penn Central ’s balanced public-interest 
analysis altogether, but he was able to convince four other 
Justices to join him in creating an exception .77 His opinion 
adopted the “bright-line” principle of law that regulations 
that deny “all economically beneficial or productive use of 
land” are categorically compensable .78 Total takings are per 
se compensable .79
The 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of New London found 
Justices Rehnquist and Scalia on the losing side of a split 
5-4 decision reminiscent of Berman .80 The majority opin-
ion held that New London’s power of eminent domain 
could be used to transfer property from one private per-
son to another private person who, from the city’s point 
of view, would use it for a more economically productive 
use .81 The dissent, in which Justice Rehnquist and Scalia 
joined, would have adopted the bright-line rule that emi-
nent domain could not be used to implement the city’s 
plans seeking purely economic benefits .82
The majority opinion in Kelo, which legitimized the tak-
ing of private property for private economic development, 
was met with widespread outrage .83 The public mood 
had turned against grand plans .84 Forty-odd state legisla-
tures imposed limits on exercises of the power of eminent 
domain85 and President George W . Bush issued an execu-
tive order restricting use of the federal power .86 State and 
federal elected officials (and the body politic) had lost faith 
in the ability of regulators to act in the public interest . Out-
side of the courtroom, the desirability of a “planned soci-
ety” was in doubt .
74 . Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U . Chi . L . Rev . 1175, 
1187-88 (1989) .
75 . 505 U .S . 1003, 22 ELR 21104 (1992) .
76 . Id. at 1008-09 .
77 . Id. at 1007 .
78 . Id. at 1117-18 .
79 . Id. at 1035 .
80 . Kelo v . City of New London, 545 U .S . 469, 35 ELR 20134 (2005) .
81 . Id. at 488-89 .
82 . Id. at 498 .
83 . Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response to Kelo, 93 
Minn . L . Rev . 2100, 2108 (2009) .
84 . See id . at 2120 .
85 . See 50 State Report Card, Castle Coal, http://castlecoalition .org/index .
php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2412&Itemid=129 (last visited 
May 24, 2014) .
86 . Exec . Order No . 13406, 71 Fed . Reg . 36973 (June 23, 2006) .
D. The Roberts Court
The Kelo term also marked a changing of the guard on 
the Supreme Court . Upon the 2005 death of Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, Justice John Roberts was appointed the 
new Chief Justice . And by 2006, the reconfigured Rob-
erts Court was perhaps the most conservative in decades .87 
A right-wing bloc of Justices (Roberts, Scalia, Clarence 
Thomas, and Samuel Alito) could be counted upon to 
vote in favor of private property rights and against govern-
ment regulations in almost each and every case . But they 
still needed a fifth vote to finish the job of eliminating the 
liberal precedents left over from the 20th century . Justice 
Anthony Kennedy would often swing to the conservative 
side, but he could not always be counted upon .88
For example, the Court had recognized in 1940 in 
United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co. that “navi-
gable waters [were] subject to national planning and control 
in the broad regulation of commerce granted the Federal 
Government .”89 The Corps had accepted that mandate 
(with the approval of the Supreme Court90) and required 
its permission as a prerequisite to private excavation and 
filling projects that had any impact on the U .S . hydrologi-
cal cycle .91 The Corps had effectively reconstituted itself as 
the federal land use control agency .
In the 2006 case Rapanos v. United States, a farmer 
had been found civilly liable for draining a marshy field 
without the Corps’ permission .92 The drainage project 
was more than 11 miles away from the nearest navigable 
water course .93 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Roberts, 
Thomas, and Alito, authored the plurality opinion vacating 
the judgment on the ground that the Corps’ jurisdiction 
only extended to wetlands with a continuous surface con-
nection to a flowing waterway .94 But the plurality opinion 
lacked the fifth vote necessary for a majority .95 Justice Ken-
nedy concurred in the result, but he proposed a “significant 
nexus” test that left the test of the territorial expanse of the 
Corps’ jurisdiction in constitutional limbo .96
The 2009 case Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida 
Department of Environmental Protection considered the 
constitutionality of a Florida law that rewarded own-
ers of eroding oceanfront lots with government-funded 
beach replenishment, but took as a price the owners’ lit-
87 . Adam Liptak, Court Under Roberts Is Most Conservative in Decades, N .Y . 
Times, July 25, 2010, at A1 .
88 . See Lisa K . Parshall, Embracing the Living Constitution: Justice Anthony M. 
Kennedy’s Move Away From a Conservative Methodology of Constitutional In-
terpretation, 30 N .C . Cent . L . Rev . 25, 28 (2007) .
89 . United States v . Appalachian Elec . Power Co ., 311 U .S . 377, 426 (1940) .
90 . See United States v . Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U .S . 121, 16 ELR 
20086 (1985); but see Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook Cnty . v . U .S . 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U .S . 159, 31 ELR 20382 (2001) .
91 . Permits for Activities in Navigable Waters or Ocean Waters, 40 Fed . Reg . 
31320 (July 25, 1975) .
92 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
93 . Id. at 720 .
94 . Id. at 739 .
95 . Id. at 719 .
96 . Id. at 787 (Kennedy, J ., concurring) .
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toral rights to future accretions .97 When the right wing of 
the Roberts Court (composed of Justices Roberts, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito) found that they were unable to garner 
the fifth vote needed to strike down the statute as a whole, 
they switched sides so as to qualify Justice Scalia to write 
the opinion . The Court held for the state on the basis of 
a misbegotten misunderstanding of Florida property law, 
and thereby avoided application of the dreaded Penn Cen-
tral balancing test .98
Justice Scalia’s strategy seems clear enough . If the pub-
lic-interest balancing test in Penn Central cannot be over-
turned, it nonetheless can be avoided . And by his dicta, 
Justice Scalia planted the seed of precedent that every 
oceanfront owner has a littoral right to accretions that is 
a separable property interest .99 Justice Scalia opined that 
once the “bundle of rights” that constitutes property is 
broken, each separate right is entitled to separate constitu-
tional protection; every taking becomes a total taking that 
is per se compensable under the Lucas rule .100 Since Justice 
Scalia’s dicta were not dispositive of the case, the left wing 
of the Court (composed of Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Stephen Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan) seems 
not to have taken notice .101
In 2013, in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management 
District, Justice Kennedy joined the right-wing bloc of Jus-
tices to create the majority of five in an opinion authored 
by Justice Alito .102 A permit applicant had engaged in 
negotiation with the regulator concerning the terms and 
conditions upon which a project might go forward .103 The 
applicant offered to mitigate environmental effects of his 
development proposal by deeding a conservation easement, 
but the regulator wanted more, demanding a reduction in 
the project size and some off-site improvements .104 Nego-
tiations broke down, and the permit was denied .105 The 
applicant filed suit alleging a “regulatory taking .”106
Under the leading 20th century precedent of Village of 
Euclid, permit denials are presumed valid .107 To prove a 
rejection unconstitutional, the applicant would have the 
burden of proving that “on balance” under the “totality 
of the circumstances” the regulator’s demands went “too 
far .”108 Few if any property owners could meet the burden 
of proof imposed by the Penn Central test .
97 . Stop the Beach Renourishment v . Florida Dep’t of Envtl . Prot ., 560 U .S . 
702, 40 ELR 20160 (2010) .
98 . Id. at 732-33; see also Garrett Power, Property Rights, the “Gang of Four” & 
the Fifth Vote: Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc . v . Florida Department of 
Environmental Protection (U.S. Supreme Court 2010), 21 Widener L . Rev . 
627 (2012) .
99 . Stop the Beach Renourishment, 560 U .S . at 708 .
100 . Id. at 713 .
101 . Id. at 742-45 .
102 . Koontz v . St . Johns River Water Mgmt . Dist ., 133 S . Ct . 2586, 2591, 43 
ELR 20140 (2013) .
103 . Id. at 2592-93 .
104 . Id.
105 . Id. at 2591 .
106 . Id. at 2593 .
107 . Village of Euclid v . Ambler Realty Co ., 272 U .S . 365 (1926) .
108 . Penn Cent . Transp . Co . v . New York City, 438 U .S . 104, 8 ELR 20528 
(1978) .
Justice Alito took a different view of the Constitution . 
He glommed onto the Nollan/Dolan precedents and con-
sidered the breakdown of negotiations as, in effect, the 
issuance of a permit with conditions attached .109 Under 
those precedents, the burden of proof was switched to 
the regulator who was required to prove an “essential 
nexus” and “rough proportionality” between its negotiat-
ing demands and the environmental impact of the pro-
posed development .110 The Court remanded the case for 
a determination of whether the regulator had imposed an 
“unconstitutional condition .”111
The Koontz case may have a profound effect on land 
use regulation . Nowadays, site-specific development agree-
ments have replaced zoning maps as the favored means of 
public land use control .112 Negotiations between the local 
jurisdiction and the landowner contractually fix the terms 
and conditions upon which a project may go forward .113 
Such agreements benefit the developer with a contractual 
guarantee of approval, and benefit the locality with cus-
tomized performance standards and assurances that infra-
structure demands will be meet .114 But when negotiations 
fail, the Court may, under the Koontz holding, second-
guess the legitimacy of the conditions proffered by the gov-
ernment and then require the government to pay damages 
if the conditions go “too far .”
III. Fifty-Year Retrospective
In 1964, Professor Reps conducted a “requiem for 
zoning .”115 He urged that land use controls imposed by the 
bright lines on the zoning maps be erased and replaced by 
flexible discretionary public regulations that would guide 
the community toward a planned society of livable com-
munities with affordable housing, adequate infrastruc-
ture, clean water and air, preserved landmarks, sustained 
resources, and environmental justice .116 He expressed 
“naïve faith” that a liberal judiciary would have no consti-
tutional objections .117
Now, 50 years later, Professor Reps’ observations and 
predictions seem to be both right and wrong . Old-fash-
ioned zoning has been buried in a shallow grave . Today’s 
land use is controlled by multiple, often overlapping per-
mits at the federal, state, and local levels . The Corps asserts 
a broadly defined jurisdiction over the waters of the United 
States, state governments mandate clean water and clean 
air and protect wetlands, and local governments demand 
building permits and exact fees and in-kind contributions 
from developers .
109 . Koontz v . St . Johns River Water Mgmt . Dist ., 133 S . Ct . 2586, 2596, 43 
ELR 20140 (2013) .
110 . Id.
111 . Id. at 2603 .
112 . See Delaney, supra note 52 .
113 . Id. at 821 .
114 . Id. at 811-12 .
115 . See Reps, supra note 4 .
116 . Id. at 64 .
117 . Id. at 66 .
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During the first two-thirds of the 20th century, Profes-
sor Reps’ faith in the Supreme Court was well-placed . Just 
as he had predicted, the “judicial liberalism” in these Court 
precedents had created a living Constitution that changed 
with the times .118 The Justices took it upon themselves to 
balance public benefits against private losses and approved 
bold government plans for a better society .
But in the years since then, the Court’s judicial conser-
vatives have sometimes shown renewed determination to 
curtail governmental activity in general, and to limit fed-
eral, state, and local planning in particular . As a result of 
their constitutional decisions:
•	 Physical occupations are per se compensable119;
•	 Total takings are per se compensable120;
•	 When a regulator and a developer fail to agree, the 
regulator bears the burden of proving the reasonable-
ness of its demands121;
•	 Regulations necessary to prevent a significant public 
harm are not excused from constitutional require-
ments of compensation122;
•	 Private owners have protected property rights in the 
navigable waters of the United States123;
•	 Federal land use controls only extend to lands con-
nected to waterways .124
And if the Roberts Court can find a fifth vote, it may 
soon be constitutional law that:
•	 The mode of analysis found in the landmark 
Penn Central decision (an ad hoc public-interest 
balancing test) is replaced with bright-line rules 
of compensability;
•	 The sticks in the “bundle of rights” in land are con-
sidered separately so that the regulatory denial of 
any stick is considered a “total taking” and is to be 
per se compensable;
•	 Exercises of the power of eminent domain are lim-
ited to situations where government itself intends to 
physically occupy the premises .
118 . See Village of Euclid v . Ambler Realty Co ., 272 U .S . 365 (1926); Penn 
Cent . Transp . Co . v . New York City, 438 U .S . 104, 8 ELR 20528 (1978) .
119 . Loretto v . Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp ., 458 U .S . 419 (1982) .
120 . Lucas v . South Carolina Coastal Comm’n, 505 U .S . 1003, 22 ELR 21104 
(1992) .
121 . Koontz v . St . Johns River Water Mgmt . Dist ., 133 S . Ct . 2586, 2591, 43 
ELR 20140 (2013) .
122 . Lucas, 505 U .S . at 1118-22 .
123 . Rapanos v . United States, 547 U .S . 715, 36 ELR 20116 (2006) .
124 . Id . at 739 .
Professor Reps’ 1964 “requiem for zoning”125 was cor-
rect in its observation that the bright line on zoning maps, 
which promised to put everything and everybody in the 
proper place, was being supplanted by flexible public plans . 
The “zoners” were being replaced by planners vested with 
discretionary regulatory powers said to be necessary to 
create pollution-free communities with affordable houses, 
good schools, thriving commerce, and more than adequate 
public services .126
But Professor Reps was wrong in his faith that the 
Court would not stand in the way of discretionary and 
flexible land use planning . Court decisions, coupled with 
the public outrage triggered by the Kelo holding, disem-
powered the planners . What better way to discourage 
planning than to require that governments compensate 
property owners for all of the private losses associated 
with its regulations? Now seems the time to compose a 
“requiem for regulation .”
IV. Coda
The future of American planning remains in doubt . On 
the basic question as to whether to look to governments 
for the solutions to economic and social problems, the 
Roberts Court is divided into two equal blocs .127 The lais-
sez-faire bloc is headed by Justice Scalia, joined by long-
time ally Justice Thomas and relative newcomers Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Alito . The pro-planning bloc 
is headed by Justice Breyer, who is joined by his long-
time ally Justice Ginsberg and relative newcomers Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan . Justice Kennedy moves back and 
forth between the two factions, often providing the deci-
sive vote in 5-4 decisions .
While both sides may claim a “humble obedience to the 
Constitution,”128 the real division seems ideological . The 
laissez-faire bloc wants to downsize government at what-
ever the cost; the pro-planning bloc looks to government 
for a solution to public problems . Only retirements, deaths, 
and appointments will tip the Court balance one way or 
the other .
125 . Reps, supra note 4 .
126 . See Delaney, supra note 52 .
127 . See Greg Stohr, Roberts Supreme Court’s Partisan Split Shows New Justices Are 
Predictable, Bloomberg, July 1, 2011, available at http://www .bloomberg .
com/news/2011-07-01/roberts-supreme-court-s-partisan-split-shows-new-
justices-are-predictable .html; David Paul Kuhn, The Incredible Polarization 
and Politicization of the Supreme Court, Atlantic, June 29, 2012, available 
at http://www .theatlantic .com/politics/archive/2012/06/the-incredible-
polarization-and-politicization-of-the-supreme-court/259155/ .
128 . J . Harvie Wilkinson III, Cosmic Constitutional Theory: Why Ameri-
cans Are Losing Their Inalienable Right to Self-Governance 46 
(Geoffrey R . Stone et al . eds ., 2012) .
Copyright © 2014 Environmental Law Institute®, Washington, DC. Reprinted with permission from ELR®, http://www.eli.org, 1-800-433-5120.
